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Fear and Loathing of Politics
in the Legal Academy
William H. Simon
In a recent lament about Bush v. Gore, Bruce Ackerman feared that the
patent groundlessness of the opinion would convince many of a proposition
he attributed to critical legal studies: that law is simply a form of politics.1
This remark reflects two tendencies prominent at the Yale Law School in
recent years: first, a preoccupation with a now extinct and never very successful movement of left legal academics, and second, a tendency to conflate this
movement with the legal conservatism ofjusice Scalia and his collaborators at
the University of Chicago and the Rehnquist Court.
These tendencies ride high throughout Anthony Kronman's brilliant book,
TheLost Lawyer.The book is a defense of a distinctive style of legal reasoningprudentialism-that is elaborated through contrasts with critical legal studies
on the one hand, and Chicago-style law and economics on the other. A critical
point that distinguishes Kronman's preferred style of legal analysis and rhetoric from the two competitors is that the competitors are self-consciously
political. Kronman suggests that the linking of professional discourse and
2
scholarship to politics is a road to "professional suicide."
I doubt ifAckerman agrees. His own work is militantly interdisciplinary, and
it unabashedly links legal analysis to political vision. Indeed if there were an
academic movement of legal liberalism, Ackerman would be its leader. However, there is no academic movement of legal liberalism. There is nothing
in centrist or left-of-center legal scholarship with a level of coherence, mutual engagement, and ideological commitment comparable to those of legal
conservatism.
This absence reflects an unfortunate anxiety about politics among nonconservative legal academics. Compulsive crit baiting is a symptom of
this anxiety. I think this anxiety is pathological in both political and academic senses.
William H. Simon is the Gertrude and William Saunders professor of law at Stanford University
and, in 2001-02, the Stephen and Barbara Friedman visiting professor of law at Columbia
University.
I am grateful to Anthony Kronman for inviting me to take part in the panel on "The Vocation of
the Law Teacher," and to the participants in the stimulating discussion at the Yale tercentennial.
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I want to consider, first, what is at stake in the debate about the political
nature of law; second, why conservatives have been so much more successful
in escaping the taboo against blurring the line between the two; and third, the
influence of the taboo on nonconservative academic work. The taboo is
largely tacit and never explicated systematically. So I am necessarily speculating. Nevertheless, I think its influence is real and largely unfortunate.
What Does It Mean to Deny the Separation of Law and Politics, and
Why Do People Get So Upset About It?
Since the advent of the modern legal academy, it has been an article of faith
among its leaders that law is fundamentally different from politics. At points, a
virtual loyalty oath to this effect was required. The denial of this orthodoxy on
the part of critical legal studies people was the first charge in the outburst of
neo-McCarthyism in the 1980s that sought to purge them from teaching
positions, with some success."
Yale in the 1930s was, of course, an enclave of heresy on this point, but in
recent decades, as Ackerman's remark exemplifies, it has remained solidly
orthodox, Yale distanced itself from critical legal studies until CLS was extinct
as a recognizable movement. Despite student agitation, Yale failed until the
1990s to appoint anyone to its faculty identified with the movement. Bruce
Ackerman, Owen Fiss, and others on the faculty spent considerable energy
attacking it, especially over the issue of the law/politics distinction. (Unlike
the neo-McCarthyite campaign just mentioned, these efforts were entirely
honorable and quite fruitful.)
An outsider might wonder what all the fuss is about. An obvious fact about
lawyers generally and law professors specifically is that many are actively
involved in politics. A majority of state legislators are lawyers, and the legal
professoriat is a time-honored route into various forms of politics. If anything,
the trend seems to have intensified in recent decades. Given this empirical correlation, it would be odd if law didn't have some strong connection
to politics.
So why is the law-is-a-form-of-politics claim so threatening? I think some of
those who reel from it misinterpret it, or fail to give it its most plausible
interpretation.
Sometimes the claim is interpreted as a form of nihilism, a denial that legal
judgments can be grounded in an, foundation more solid than the will of the
decision-maker. This would be a plausible interpretation of the law-is-politics
claim only if the proponents thought of politics as a form of nihilism. But
hardly anyone believes this. Howevermuch disappointed we are by politics,
nearly everyone believes that politics can and should be principled in important respects, and we constantly criticize political decisions as corrupt, unjust,
inefficient-which no nihilist could do.
Sometimes the law-is-politics claim has been interpreted to hold that a
judge should care only about the substantively appropriate outcome and
3.
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ignore procedural or institutional norms that limit her authority. The
decision-maker assumes a "roving commission" to do justice according to her
lights heedless of the authority of coordinate decision-makers, notably legislators. She thus becomes "outcome oriented" and blind to values of process and
authority. This reading also squares poorly with some of the most salient
articulated premises of critical legal studies. For example, CLS tends to invoke
the value of democracy quite insistently. This hardly seems compatible with
judicial dictatorship. It is true that some CLS writing objects to the tendency of
mainstream scholarship to presume that every legislative product is democratic without any consideration of the actual circumstances and operation of
the legislature in question. Such doubts might well pave the way for a revised
conception of judicial authority, but they in no way imply disregard for
principles of authority.
Yet another understanding of law-is-politics is as a claim that the interpretation of legal authority is unconstrained: you can reach any conclusion from
any set of rules or cases. In fact, CLS did emphasize interpretive openness, and
it delighted in applying skepticism to established dogmas, but it rarely, if ever,
suggested that any answer was as defensible as any other. And some of its bestknown tendencies imply the opposite. CLS writers were well known for arguing that legal doctrine often serves to legitimate an unjust status quo. But if
doctrinal precepts were equally compatible with any set of circumstances, they
would be unable to legitimate anything.
The most plausible interpretation of the law-is-politics claim embraces two
points: first, there is no important technique of legal decision that is fundamentally different from techniques of political decision; and second, many
particular legal decisions ultimately implicate broader contested social visions
and political theories. Any attempt at deep or comprehensive understanding
of these doctrines leads to discussion that involves such visions and theories.4
Once the claim is framed this way, I doubt that Ackerman would disagree
with it. His own work is a striking exemplification of it. For example, his
critique of Bush v. Goreis pure political theory. And his more ambitious works
all deal with legal questions in the context of broad social theories.
Although I don't expect Ackerman to object to the law-is-politics claim as
I've formulated it, others would, and the tendency to misread the claim that
Ackerman exemplifies seems a symptom of some discomfort with it, even
among those who don't object explicitly. There remains a powerful tendency
in the legal academy to regard the failure of one's views on legal controversies
to converge consistently with any recognizable political ideology as a hallmark
of intellectual integrity. The most comfortable place in the legal academy has
usually been in the center, and it is easiest to hold your place there when your
legal views are occasionally at odds with your political convictions. When this
pressure becomes intense it produces a character type I call the compulsive
4.
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centrist, who tends to resolve issues by sensing the polar positions and then
situating himself midway between them. Or then there's the type Duncan
Kennedy calls bipolar, who veers back and forth between conventional left
and right positions before she can be identified with either.
I am not talking here about efforts from within an identifiable political
position to question or revise conventional beliefs, but rather about a tendency to move above the terrain of political contest and avoid association with
any of the contestants.
In an op-ed column last year, my colleague Kathleen M. Sullivan, warning
about the difficulty of using electoral politics to influence the Supreme Court,
observed that the current Court and several of itsjustices do not vote consistentlv to uphold or reject claims of state governments protesting federal
restrictions, or of property owners alleging takings, or of criminal defendants
invoking due process, or of the media invoking the First Amendment. The
justices, she concluded, resist "efforts to label them as liberal or conservative";
"decline ... to march in political lock step"; and "do not vote along simple

ideological lines."; She did not suggest that the justices' various positions were
unified by some discernible nonideological perspective. Nor did she try to save
them from the inference that they are simply incoherent. Although it seems an
odd qualification for political immunity, incoherence has often seemed preferable within the legal academy to ideologically identifiable consistency.
The Heretical Success of Legal Conservatism
The taboo on conflating law and politics was enormously powerful from the
1950s to the 1970s, when it was challenged from the left by critical legal studies
and from the right by legal conservatism. I use the term legal conservatism to
refer to the overlapping sectors of law and economics, conservative moralism,
and libertarianism grounded in institutions such as the University of Chicago,
the Federalist Society, and the Olin Foundation.
The political success of this academic movement during the Reagan administration was striking and has continued under the subsequent Bush administrations. It captured an elite law school and turned it into a bastion of
conservative scholarship. It established contingents at many other law schools.
It forged strong ties to the Republican Party that resulted in many high-lexel
appointments in Republican administrations. And its members have been
favored with a substantial number ofjudicial appointments.
There is no counterpart in the center or left of the spectrum that rivals the
success of legal conservatism. The Chicago movement is often compared to
critical legal studies, probably because it is the only other tendency in the legal
academy that seemed recognizable as a comparably coherent movement. But
CLS never had anything approaching the success of the Chicago School. It
never had any influence outside the academy at all, except as an object of
gawking spectacle in the mass media. Within the academy, it had a brief
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fashion that resulted in some adherents' getting appointments at a range of
law schools, but this period soon ended, and self-identified crits and CLS
scholarship virtually disappeared. Mainstream commentators both in and
outside the academy, who tended to treat the conservative takeover of Chicago as an instance of the normal ebb and flow of the marketplace of ideas,
spoke of the far less ambitious maneuverings of a crit minority at Harvard as a
campaign of terrorist subversion.
More important than the fading of CLS, however, is the fact that there is no
other comparable example of a self-consciously political intellectual movement among academic lawyers. The void is especially remarkable given the
fact that most academics are centrist liberals.
No doubt the political success of legal conservatism is partly attributable to
the fact that it has produced a powerful body of scholarly work that links a
coherent general understanding of society to a series of elaborately argued
policy prescriptions. But other factors in its success are worth noting.
First, its theoretical orientation and policy proposals have had an affinity
with the commitments of an increasingly powerful conservative political establishment and three Republican political administrations. There has been, in
other words, important demand for its product. One consequence of this
advantage is that it is easy for Chicago School scholars to portray themselves as
pragmatic and their theoretical orientation as having practical value. When
powerful people are interested in your analyses and willing to back your
prescriptions, you seem worldly. By contrast, theory disdained by the centers
of power seems Utopian and naive. Moreover, there's very little point in
working out the details of policy proposals that have no chance of enactment.
So oppositionist work tends to stay at a higher level of generality. As a result, it
is often accused of impracticality.
This was a common rhetorical move of crit baiting. Many attacks flayed CLS
for not producing detailed policy proposals. According to a recent one, "The
Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies" was What should be done? This is
nonsense. In fact, CLS produced more than its share of policy proposals, and
it would have produced more had political actors been awaiting them. 7 But
people tended to ignore the policy proposals. Abstract left theory intrigued
and engaged people, but concrete policy proposals tried their patience. (And
the criticism was simply a pose; none of the authors of the many articles
decrying the absence of CLS program spent any effort to engage with the
reform proposals that were advanced.)
Things might have been different, of course, had there been a strong
liberal or left political movement open to alternative programmatic thinking.
But there hasn't been. The Democratic Party has not been open to daring or
unconventional thinking or to any activity that smacks of ideology.
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Crits have a lot of company as victims of this situation. The New York Times
recently noted that, compared to Europe, America tends to ignore programmatic theorizing by left-of-center thinkers. As an example of an academic who
has been unjustly neglected in this situation, it named- Bruce Ackerman.
Ackerman's book with Anne Alstott on "stakeholder grants" is exactly the kind
of ideology-linked, theoretically grounded policy work that could fuel a political movement. Indeed, according to the Times, it is doing that in Britain.' But
in the absence of any movement here that might actually embrace the proposal, there is relatively little interest. It is simply too concrete, too worked out
to engage left intellectuals in the current mood of disempowerment. They'd
rather read Ackerman on the Fourteenth Amendment, just as they'd rather
read Duncan Kennedy on "Form and Substance in Private Law" than on when
habitability code enforcement is likely to benefit low-income tenants.
Second, academic theory appears to have more glamor for right-wing
politicians than it does for liberal ones. Right-wing politicians are less likely to
be intellectuals than liberal ones, but they are more likely to be insecure about
their social status than liberal ones. Legitimation from the academy seems to
be important for many of them. They may not be particularly interested in
what academics have to say, but it is important to them to know that there is
support in the academy for their views and that they can occasionally coinmand deference from particular academics. So the ornamental and therapeutic dimension of the demand for academic work is stronger on the right than
on the left.
Third, the right-wing academic work derives some political efficacy from
the fact that its style is relatively dogmatic. By this, I don't mean emphatic or
conclusory, though legal conservatism does have more than its share of
personalities noted for their table-pounding assertiveness. Rather, I mean that
conservative work is more likely to take a form that starts with general principles-whether textual or theoretical-and reasons to definite conclusions.
This form mimics that of both natural science and fundamentalist moralism,
and it gives conservative work more rhetorical power with nonacademic
audiences. The conservatives are prepared to show the lay audience that some
norm or value that they are prepared to sign on to leads ultimately to some
definite policy prescription.
Liberals, on the other hand, are more often condemned by their methods
to tentativeness, and to a rhetorical style that, in contemporary political
culture, risks sounding iealy-mouthed. For example, the most important
current philosophical influence on liberal academics is pragmatism. Pragmnatism exhorts provisionality and experimentation. Pragmatists don't sell their
policies by showing how the), are compelled by first principles. They say, in
effect, "Let's try it and see if it works." But this style is less conducive to
rhetorical efficacy in a sound-bite political culture.
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A fourth factor that may bear on the relative failure of critical legal studies
is tactical. In its scholarly efforts, legal conservatism rarely explicitly challenges
the law/politics taboo. Critical legal studies inveterately and ostentatiously
challenged it. Legal conservatism generally portrays itself as less radical than it
really is, while critical legal studies tended to do the opposite. That was
probably a mistake. By emphasizing and even exaggerating its radicalism, CLS
generated expectations among prospective adherents that it was bound to
disappoint and aroused anxieties among outsiders that hampered constructive dialog.
These advantages account for the success of legal conservatism in defying
the law/politics taboo. Without them, nonconservative academics remain
paralyzed by the taboo.
The Costs of the Taboo
From a nonconservative political point of view, the cost of the antipolitical
impulse in the liberal academy has been the diminution in the intellectual
resources available for nonconservative politics. But there is a further cost
from a purely academic point of view. The distaste for engagement and the
tendency to shy away from issues and positions with ideological connotations
sometimes impoverishes scholarship by making it excessively abstract. Elusive
abstractness not only makes it difficult to apply general principles; it inhibits
explanation and elaboration of them.
I don't want to exaggerate this problem. Let me reaffirm my concession
that there is a lot of important nonconservative scholarship being done atYale
and elsewhere that combines theory with ideologically engaged policy prescriptions. (For example, work by Akhil Amar, Ian Ayres, Harold Koh, Vicki
Schultz.) Let me also acknowledge that there are many important subjects of
legal scholarship without clear ideological implications. (Is it a right or left
position to oppose management discretion to install corporate takeover defenses? I have no idea.)
And, finally, let me concede that the goals of the academy are sometimes
necessarily in tension with the goals of politics. Scholarly inquiry sometimes
leads to conclusions that undermine our political projects. Academic values
require honesty and willingness to confront complexity and ambiguity; politics sometimes requires deception and manipulative oversimplification. And
the academy rightly strives for a degree of community across divergent views
that is not compatible with the more aggressive forms of political conflict.
Nevertheless, it has always been part of the mission of American universities, and especially law schools, to prepare people for worldly roles. These
roles are entrenched in politics. Moreover, the project of purely contemplative understanding of society requires willingness to engage at least intellectually with political phenomena. Thus, aside from its effect on the resources of
nonconservative political movements, a tendency to shy away from politics
would jeopardize academic values. It seems to me such a tendency now operates in the legal academy.
Consider three examples: first, the Yale moralists-Anthony Kronman and
Stephen Carter. Kronman is the champion of classical prudence, the practical
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reasoning that combines sympathy with detachment, general principles with
particularistic intuition. Carter is the defender of the Protestant ethic-selrestraint, integrity, and piety. Both see themselves as fighting the currents of
fashion, and both have shown ingenuity and daring in arguing that these
traditions deserve more respect than they have been getting.
Yet both Kronman and Carter are remarkably short on concrete examples
of moralism in practice. Kronman's book is ostensibly a critique of lawyers, but
it has nothing to say about an), of the current controversies of professional
responsibility and does not mention a single specific instance of lawycring.
Carter strives to remain aloof from current political controversies.
Neither gives any indication of having noticed that moralistic rhetoric quite
close to theirs has been hijacked by the most aggressive and conservative
faction of the Republican party and was deployed like artillery in the Clinton
impeachment affair and the Florida election controversy. The political practices of Machiavelli were rationalized in the language of moralism.
Perhaps Kronman and Carter would be willing to defend these practices as
plausible entailments of their positions. Perhaps (more likely, I think) not.
But our uncertainty about this means that they haven't explained their ideas
as well as we have a right to expect to them to.
My second example concerns the scholarship associated with law school
clinical teaching.' This focus is the autonomy of the client. The main preoccupation of recent scholarship by clinical teachers is on the ways in which lawyers
for poor people alienate and dominate their clients. The form of these articles
often begins as a first-person narrative in which the lawyer, consciously or not,
betrays or fails the client in some respect. The article then proceeds to draw
on literary or psychological theory to analyze the mechanisms and practices
through which this oppression occurs.
The problems with which this literature is concerned are real, but I think
we can still question whether they deserve the effort expended on them. The
normative premise of this work-client autonomy--is the bedrock premise of
the mainstream professionalism. The literature is largely silent on the extent
to which this mainstream premise might be inappropriate or dysfunctional for
poor clients. (For example, because its individualism impedes the type of
collective action that has the greatest promise to address the systemic problems these clients face.)
But the most curious fact about the clinical literature is how relatively little
it has to tell us about those aspects of lawyering that occur once the autonomy
of the client has been safeguarded. Once you take on a client, successfully
discern her goals, and commit yourself to them, what do you do to advance
these goals? How does one engage with the welfare system or landlords or
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employers or schools to induce them to yield benefits to these clients? Surely
these are not matters that can be taken for granted. By all accounts, this is an
era in which it has become increasingly difficult to produce tangible gains
through lawyering for poor clients. Yet clinical scholarship remains preoccupied with lawyer-client relations, rather than the potential impact of lawyering
on the outside world.
The depoliticization theme seems unmistakable here. Lawyering for poor
people was once identified strongly with liberal activism. Intense political
controversies have arisen in most substantive areas of practice. By contrast, the
lawyering norms that legal services lawyers espouse are indistinguishable from
those of the mainstream bar. By focusing on client autonomy issues, clinicians
remain safely in the realm of mainstream consensus. But they pay the price of
ignoring some of their most pressing and interesting concerns.
My third example concerns the emergence of international human rights
as a central focus of activity among left-of-center students and teachers in
recent years. Some of the most exciting nonconservative scholarship, teaching, and clinical work has come out of this area. The achievements of law
teachers and associated practitioners here are impressive. They have helped
clients in desperate situations, they have drawn public attention to important
issues, and they have engaged the energies and aspirations of some of the
most idealistic law students.
Yet I cannot help but view the growth and success of this field in the light of
the simultaneous decline in interest, energy, and morale in the fields that
focused on domestic issues of economicjustice. Traditional labor law seems to
be dying in the law schools at a much faster rate than in the larger society. Social
policy issues such as housing andwelfare have waned dramatically as subjects of
scholarly effort and student interest. Clinics that focus on these and other
issues of the domestic poor now often have trouble attracting enrollment.
It is, of course, no discredit to the human rights movement that it has
partially displaced the interest in domestic social and economic policy of
earlier decades. My point is simply that the shift may be evidence of the
antipolitical impulse I'm discussing. Compared to the economic and social
policy subjects that were prominent in the past, human rights has two salient
characteristics. First, its normative concerns are primarily focused on societies
other than the United States. Our society comes in for criticism as an aider
and abettor of various foreign violators, but human rights rhetoric does not
engage the major domestic axes of political division in America. Second,
human rights rhetoric is preoccupied with cruelty, rather than the central
ethical preoccupation of domestic policy-injustice.Cruelty is a less controversial topic in the sense that, while no one supports either cruelty or injustice as
such, there is much more consensus about what cruelty involves. Human
rights rhetoric tends to go back and forth between compelling and normatively uncontroversial depictions of outrageous cruelty and a set of highly
technical and narrowly legal questions. It is far less political in the sense I
defined the term above: its legal concerns less quickly implicate basic contested
visions of social order.
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No doubt both historical developments and the importance of the issues
are sufficient to account for the growth in interest in human rights. But the
relative decline in interest in subjects that implicate distributive issues of
domestic politics is harder to explain. The importance of these issues does not
seem to have declined in any objective sense. Perhaps then we should see fear
and loathing of politics as playing a role.

